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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

August 26, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR

NSC Review Completed.

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense*
The Attorney General**
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence

I hereby direct that the products of satellite reconnaissance, and information of the fact of such reconnaissance revealed by the product, shall be given strict security handling under the provisions of a special security control system approved by me. I hereby approve the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System for this purpose.

Within your agency, you shall be personally responsible for the selection of those personnel who will have access to the foregoing information and for determining the scope of that access. Access is to be on a "must know" basis related to major national security needs. A list of those selected shall be furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence, who will maintain and review the control roster. When they are indoctrinated, they shall be informed of my specific direction to them that the provisions of the special Security Control System I have approved be strictly complied with, including the prohibition upon them of imparting any information within this system to any person not specifically known to them to be on the list of those authorized to receive this material. The responsibility for the selection of personnel may be delegated only to the senior intelligence chief or chiefs within the agencies serving as members of the U. S. Intelligence Board.

The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, will be responsible to me for determining all questions involved in the continued protection and control of the foregoing material and information, including the development of a common understanding as to the meaning of the term " 'must know' basis related to major national security needs," and a broad consensus as to the numbers of personnel in each agency comprehended by this term.

*For Department of Defense
including OSD, JCS, Army,
Navy, Air Force, and NSA
**For Director, FBI

signed Dwight D. Eisenhower

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NSC Action

2454

Space Policy and Intelligence Requirements

- a. Discussed the report of the ad hoc committee on political and informational aspects of satellite reconnaissance policy, prepared in response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 156.
- b. Approved recommendations 1 through 17 of the report (see attachment).
- c. Approved recommendation 18, revised as follows:

"The US should not, in presenting more detailed proposals for a separate group of measures to 'reduce the risks of war,' include advance notification of space launchings. If attempts are made by others to include space launchings with missile firings, the US should point out that (a) the trajectory of space vehicles can be distinguished from missile firings, so that space launchings would not be confused with missile firings, and (b) measures relating to disarmament of outer space, which we are proposing, include appropriate controls over space launchings."
- d. Referred recommendation 19 to the ad hoc committee for revision in light of the discussion.
- e. Noted the President's request that he receive promptly from the ad hoc committee specific recommendations as to the instructions to be given to Ambassador Dean covering his negotiations during the forthcoming disarmament talks in Geneva.

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ATTACHMENT

RECOMMENDED POLICY

1. The United States should maintain the legal position that the principles of international law and the UN Charter apply to activities in outer space and, specifically, that outer space is free, as are the high seas.
2. The US should therefore continue to avoid any position implying that reconnaissance activities in outer space are not legitimate. Similarly, we should avoid any position declaring or implying that such activities are not "peaceful uses."
3. The US should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid public use of the term "reconnaissance" satellites, and where appropriate use instead such broader and more neutral terms as "observation" or "photographic" satellites.
4. Further studies should be made on an urgent basis to determine whether there are releasable data, such as mapping information, or procedures such as occasionally calling [] and [] vehicles "photographic" satellites, which would help create wider public acceptance of space observation and photography.
5. NASA should study urgently the possibilities of accelerating bilateral international cooperation to develop non-military space activities involving space observation, perhaps including photography.
6. It is recognized that the US cannot entirely avoid or disclaim interest in reconnaissance, so that where feasible the US should also seek to gain acceptance of the principle of the legitimacy of space reconnaissance.
7. When confronted by specific Soviet pressure to outlaw reconnaissance activities in space, the US should continue to take a public stand for the legitimacy of the principle of reconnaissance from outer space, the precise form and extent of which would depend upon the circumstances of the confrontation.
8. The US should not at this time attempt to conduct a truly clandestine program (by which we mean a program with covert and unregistered launchings, and public denial that the US is engaged in reconnaissance). However, the US should pursue the research and development for a stand-by capability for clandestine operations in case circumstances ever make such operations necessary.

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9. The present practice of not identifying individual military space launchings by mission or purpose is sound. We believe, however, that there should also be a more open (but not more detailed) public reference to the general over-all military program. An appropriate nickname for public identification should be given to the over-all military program, with its objectives intentionally stated in broad and general terms. All military launchings would be described in terms of the general objectives of the over-all military program. No specific mission would be ascribed to any particular launch.

10. The US should not, at this time, publicly disclose the status, extent, effectiveness or operational characteristics of its reconnaissance program.

11. Strict control over public statements and backgrounding concerning reconnaissance satellites should be exercised to ensure consistency with the policy guide-lines suggested in these recommendations.

12. No public attention should be directed toward development of anti-satellite capabilities, and any publicized demonstration of developmental work and any actual test of such a capability should require White House approval, with full account given to the adverse effects for our reconnaissance satellite program. We should avoid any indications that physical countermeasures to reconnaissance vehicles would be justified, and as appropriate the US should make a positive effort to propagate the idea that interference with or attacks on any space vehicle of another country in peacetime are inadmissible and illegal.

13. The US should discreetly disclose to certain allies and neutrals selected information with regard to the US space reconnaissance program, making each disclosure orally and at a time and in a manner that will preserve the essential security of our program while impressing upon them its importance for the security of the Free World. Disclosures should be made in a manner that will preclude acquisition by the Communist Bloc of usable evidence of an official US acknowledgement that we are conducting a satellite reconnaissance program. Proposals for such disclosures should include clearance by the National Reconnaissance Office.

14. The US should in private disclosures emphasize the fact of our determination and ability to pursue such programs because of their great importance to our common security, despite any efforts to dissuade us.

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15. The US should note in connection with private disclosures that, except in some cases for specifically defined disarmament agreements, the US cannot agree to (a) declarations of the precise purpose of all satellites, (b) declarations of the equipment of all satellites, (c) general requirements for advance notification of all satellite launchings and the tracks of satellites, (d) pre-launch inspection of the satellites, or (e) a specific definition of peaceful uses of space which does not embrace unlimited observation.

16. The possible roles of space reconnaissance in disarmament inspection arrangements or in creating military stability should be further studied.

17. The US should stand by the disarmament proposal for a provision in Stage One of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament banning weapons of mass destruction from being carried in satellites, and providing for advance notification and inspection of all missile and space launchings to insure that ban. The US should continue to exclude any ban on reconnaissance satellites.

18. See page 2 (above)

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August 27, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 183

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, Office of Science and Technology

(SUBJECT: Space Program of the United States)

The President desires that the space program of the United States be forcefully explained and defended at the forthcoming sessions of the UN Outer Space Committee and the General Assembly. The Department of State is requested to consult with the Department of Defense, CIA, NASA, AEC, ACDA and the Office of the Science Adviser to develop positions which meet the following objectives:

1. To show that the distinction between peaceful and aggressive uses of outer space is not the same as the distinction between military and civilian uses, and that U. S. aims to keep space free from aggressive use and offers cooperation in its peaceful exploitation for scientific and technological purposes.
2. To build and sustain support for the legality and propriety of the use of space for reconnaissance. This position should proceed from the approved recommendations of the report submitted on this subject on June 30, 1962.
3. To make it plain that neither U. S. nuclear tests nor other U. S. experiments in space were undertaken without a proper sense of scientific responsibility, and that, in the case of the nuclear tests, these were a response to previous Soviet tests.
4. To demonstrate the precautionary character of the U. S. military program in space.
5. To show that U. S. policies for communication satellites are fully consistent with cooperative international arrangements.

/s/ McGeorge Bundy

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